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In the case of  Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld),
1 
the High Court declared that preventive detention 
legislation passed by the Queensland Parliament in 
2003 was constitutionally valid. Put simply, preventive 
detention laws allow a person to be detained in prison, 
not merely because of  something they have done in the 
past, but based on an assessment they may re-offend in 
future, if  released. This assessment of  likely recidivism 
may be based on a number of  factors, including reports 
of  psychiatrists, past criminal behaviour, rehabilitation, 
and any statement of  intention by the offender. This 
legislation has clear national implications, with some 
state governments apparently planning similar-styled, 
electorally popular, preventive detention regimes in the 
light of  the High Court’s verdict on the issue. Such laws 
raise real concerns about civil liberties, and raise the 
issue of  the role of  judges in protecting fundamental 
rights and freedoms from attack by parliament.
Introduction to preventive detention laws
Preventive detention laws were not unknown in 
Australia before the passage of  the Dangerous Prisoners 
(Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (‘the Queensland 
Act’). The New South Wales Government passed 
similar legislation, the Community Protection Act in 1994 
(‘the NSW Act’).2 Section 5 of  the NSW Act allowed 
the state’s Attorney General to make an application 
regarding a ‘specifi ed’ person. Originally, the legislation 
had general application, but in the course of  its passage 
through parliament, it was confi ned to one offender 
only, Gregory Kable. Kable had been convicted of  
the manslaughter of  his wife and had allegedly made 
threats that upon his release from prison for this 
offence, he would harm his wife’s family. The NSW Act 
empowered the Supreme Court of  New South Wales 
to make an application that Kable be detained if  they 
were satisfi ed on reasonable grounds that the offender: 
(a) was more likely than not to commit a serious act of  
violence; and (b) it was appropriate for the protection 
of  the community that the offender be detained. It is 
necessary to discuss the fate of  the law in that case, 
because there are clear parallels between the legislation 
challenged in that case, and the Queensland Act.
In Kable v Director of  Public Prosecutions (NSW) four of  
the six High Court judges struck down the NSW Act 
as being offensive to the Commonwealth Constitution.3 
A majority found that as State Courts exercised 
federal jurisdiction, they were part of  the federal 
court structure. As a result, the principle of  separation 
of  powers that clearly existed in the Commonwealth 
Constitution was drawn down to state courts despite 
the absence of  this principle in state constitutions.4 
The Court therefore found that the NSW Act offended 
the principle of  separation of  powers because it asked 
the Supreme Court of  New South Wales, clearly a 
judicial body, to exercise this non-judicial power. The 
assessment of  whether or not a person would reoffend 
if  released from prison is an executive decision typically 
exercised by a Parole Board.
Of  the majority judges, Gaudron J noted that while the 
proceedings contemplated by the NSW Act were not 
ordinarily known to the law, the Act attempted to dress 
them up ‘as proceedings involving the judicial process’.5 
However, Gaudron J observed that the proceedings 
permit the making of  an order involving:
… a guess … whether on the balance of  probabilities 
the appellant will commit a [further offence] … depriving 
an individual of  his liberty, not because he has breached 
any law, but because an opinion is formed, on the basis of  
material which does not necessarily constitute evidence 
admissible in legal proceedings, that he ‘is more likely than 
not’ to breach a law by committing a serious act of  violence.
Consequently, Gaudron J concluded that the powers 
given by the law involved:
… the antithesis of  the judicial process, one of  the central 
purposes of  which is … to protect ‘the individual from 
arbitrary punishment and the arbitrary abrogation of  rights 
by ensuring that punishment is not infl icted and rights are 
not interfered with other than in consequence of  the fair 
and impartial application of  the relevant law to facts which 
have been properly ascertained’.
It is not a power that is properly characterized as a judicial 
function, notwithstanding that it is purportedly conferred 
on a court and its exercise is conditioned in terms usually 
associated with the judicial process … the effect of  the 
[provision] is in my view to compromise the integrity 
of  the Supreme Court …6
Justice Gaudron added:
Public confi dence cannot be maintained in the courts and 
their criminal processes if  ... the courts are required to 
deprive persons of  their liberty, not on the basis that they 
have breached any law, but on the basis that an opinion is 
formed, by reference to material which may or may not 
be admissible in legal proceedings, that on the balance of  
probabilities, they may do so.7
She described proceedings in the Act as ‘dressed up 
as proceedings involving the judicial process. In so 
doing, the Act makes a mockery of  that process, and 
inevitably weakens public confi dence in it’.8
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Act 2003 (Qld) s 3.
10. Schedule to the Queensland Act.
11. This includes any other medical, 
psychiatric or psychological or other 
assessment relating to the prisoner, 
any evidence of  a propensity on the 
offender’s part towards violent behaviour, 
any pattern of  violent behaviour, 
whether the offender has undergone 
rehabilitation while in prison, the prisoner’s 
criminal history, the risk of  re-offending, 
the need for community protection, 
and any other relevant matter (s 13(4) 
of  the Queensland Act).
12. Baker v R (2004) 210 ALR 1, 17.
13. ‘Fardon, 52-3.
The Dangerous Prisoners 
(Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld)
The Queensland Act was passed on 27 June 2003. 
Its stated objectives are to:
(a) provide for the continued detention in custody or 
supervised release of  a particular class of  prisoner 
to ensure adequate protection of  the community
(b) provide continuing control, care or treatment 
of  a particular class of  prisoner to facilitate their 
rehabilitation.9
The Act applies only to those offenders who are or 
were in custody serving a period of  imprisonment for a 
serious sexual offence defi ned as an offence of  a sexual 
nature involving violence against children.10 The Act 
has retrospective operation, applying to offenders who 
were sentenced to a period of  imprisonment prior to 
the law coming into force.
Under the Act, the government may make an 
application that an offender remain in detention if  it 
is satisfi ed the prisoner poses a ‘serious danger to the 
community’, or considers there is an unacceptable risk 
the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence if  
released from custody, or released without condition. 
The court must be satisfi ed this risk exists through 
‘acceptable, cogent evidence and to a high degree of  
probability’. The court can consider a broad range of  
evidence in hearing the application.11 The overriding 
factor is community protection, so presumably a 
court with doubts as to whether it should grant 
the application is encouraged to err on the side of  
caution. There is no reference to the rules of  evidence 
in hearing such an application, and it seems they do 
not apply. Evidence that would not be admissible in 
‘ordinary’ legal proceedings could be admitted in an 
application made under this legislation.
If  satisfi ed that the offender presents an unacceptable 
risk of  re-offending, the court has various options 
under the Act including further incarceration for a 
maximum of  12 months. At the end of  this further 12 
months, the Queensland Attorney General may apply 
for further detention of  the offender on the same 
grounds as the fi rst application. Alternatively, the court 
may order the person be released under supervision or 
the application should be rejected outright.
One imperative for the Queensland Act was that 
prisoner Robert Fardon, who had served several terms 
of  imprisonment for a string of  violent offences, was 
due for release from a Queensland jail on 29 June 2003. 
There were fears Fardon would re-offend if  released 
from prison. Following the introduction of  the Act, and 
an application by the Queensland Attorney General, 
Fardon was kept in prison. Several other applications 
have subsequently been made, and at the time of  
writing, all have been upheld.
High Court fi nds legislation is valid
Fardon challenged the validity of  the Act in the 
Queensland Court of  Appeal and in the High Court. 
Both challenges were unsuccessful and the law is likely 
to be used as a template for similar state regimes in 
the future.
These decisions were a surprise to some 
commentators who saw the High Court’s Kable 
decision as a strong re-affi rmation of  judicial 
independence, and as ‘a line in the sand’ against 
attempts by state governments to involve state 
courts in the continued detention of  offenders who 
have served their original jail terms. The effect of  the 
Fardon verdicts is certainly to wash away this line. As 
Kirby J eloquently observed of  the Kable decision, ‘a 
constitutional watchdog … would bark but once’.12
Majority justices
In issuing his judgment in Fardon, Chief  Justice Gleeson 
started with the interesting statement:
There are important issues that could be raised about the 
legislative policy of  continuing detention of  offenders who 
have served their terms of  imprisonment, and who are 
regarded as a danger to the community when released. 
Substantial questions of  civil liberties arise. This case is not 
concerned with those wider issues.13
One wonders, with respect, why this case is not 
concerned with those wider issues. One of  the 
reasons for the principle of  the separation of  powers 
is to avoid the situation where too much power is 
reposed in one body. Each arm of  government is to 
act as a check and balance on the others. Indirectly, 
the separation of  powers protects civil liberties. Why 
then is this case, which clearly raises separation of  
powers issues, not about civil liberties? The legislation 
takes away one of  the most fundamental civil liberties 
of  all — the right to liberty. Is it contrived to assess 
the validity of  the law ignoring this fact? Some citizens 
look to judges to defend civil liberties from attack by 
powerful parliaments. They view the courts as the only 
institution standing between parliament and citizens and 
sometimes the only recourse a person may have when 
their civil liberties are ignored.
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14. It is true also the NSW proceedings 
were declared to be civil in nature, 
while the Queensland proceedings are 
not described as civil or criminal. 
The New South Wales Act applied whether 
or not the offender was incarcerated at the 
time of  the application; the Queensland Act 
applies only to those incarcerated at the 
time of  the application, and any offenders 
who are incarcerated after 
the law is passed.
15. Fardon, 61.
16. Callinan and Heydon JJ agreed that 
the purpose of  the detention here was 
for ‘community protection and not 
punishment’. Fardon 109.
17. Fardon, 80.
18. His Honour also noted that an appeal 
against a decision of  the Supreme Court 
was possible in the Fardon law; he did not 
refer to the fact that an appeal was also 
possible in the Community Protection Act 
1994 (NSW), which he had found to be 
unconstitutional.
19. Gummow J also emphasised that the 
offender might appeal an adverse fi nding 
against him, but did not acknowledge that 
the possibility existed also in the NSW 
Act that he found to be unconstitutional 
in Kable.
20. Fardon, 95.
21. Fardon, 95.
22. Fardon, 88.
23. Fardon,101-2. Kirby J did not suggest 
that the Queensland Act was being used 
for political purposes. 
Rather than overruling the Kable principle, members 
of  the majority found points of  distinction between 
the current law and the law invalidated by the High 
Court in the 1995 Kable decision. First, while the Kable 
law applied (in the fi nal result) to only one offender, 
this legislation applied to a category of  offenders. 
Second, while the Kable law required the court only be 
satisfi ed that the prisoner was more likely than not to 
re-offend, this legislation required the evidence to show 
a ‘high degree of  probability’ that the offender would 
re-offend. Finally, while the Kable law gave the judges 
only two choices — continued detention or release, 
the Queensland law gave them three — continued 
detention, release, or release on condition (for 
example supervised release). These differences are at 
least real, and can be conceded.14
However, some members of  the majority suggested 
differences between the Queensland and NSW Acts 
that cannot be conceded. This is particularly the case 
in the judgments of  McHugh and Gummow JJ and 
Gleeson CJ, two of  whom were in the majority in the 
Kable case in denouncing the NSW Act as invalid. How 
did these judges justify a different outcome in Fardon?
Justice McHugh found justifi cation for the Queensland 
Act on the basis that ‘the Act is not designed to punish 
the prisoner. It is designed to protect the community 
against certain classes of  convicted sexual offenders’.15 
Justice McHugh found a statement in the Act that its 
object was community protection persuasive in this 
regard.16 While the relevant legislation in the Kable 
decision, namely the NSW Act, was also clearly based 
on community protection grounds, this did not lead 
McHugh J to conclude that the legislation was valid in 
that case.
Justice Gummow was persuaded by the argument that 
since the prisoner had been guilty of  a past crime, 
‘there remained a connection between the operation 
of  the Act and anterior conviction by the usual judicial 
processes’.17 Again, this could have been said with 
regard to the legislation considered in Kable. However, 
this was not an argument that impressed the judge in 
Kable and one wonders why he relies on it in Fardon to 
justify his different view of  the Queensland Act.18
Chief  Justice Gleeson noted that the rules of  evidence 
applied, the Attorney General bore the onus of  proof, 
hearings were to be conducted in public, and that there 
was a right to appeal.19 He also observed that each case 
was determined on its merits. With respect, the same 
may be said with regard to the Kable case.
None of  the factors raised by these judges is relevant to 
distinguishing these two cases to the point of  justifying 
a different conclusion. Some may gain the inference, 
when reading only the Fardon decision, that all of  these 
points serve to distinguish the current case from the 
Kable precedent. However, anyone who has also read 
the Kable decision will know that these are not points 
on which the legislation in the two cases differs.
Dissenting Justice (Kirby J)
Justice Kirby noted that a fundamental premise of  
Australian law is that an individual should not be 
imprisoned because of  their beliefs, nor for future 
crimes which they may or may not commit. The 
Queensland Act offended that fundamental principle. 
Liberty was the most fundamental of  rights. He 
conceded that in strictly limited cases, the civil law 
provided for involuntary detention in such cases 
as insanity, infectious diseases, or illegal entrants to 
Australia, but this case should not be included within 
this class of  exceptional cases. While there had been 
some attempt to dress this Act up as being civil in 
nature, in reality the law was punitive and therefore 
criminal in nature. Legislation of  this kind, he found, 
undermined public confi dence in the judiciary in a 
fundamental way.20 The legislation asked a judicial body, 
established to exercise judicial power (in other words, 
the application of  law to past events or conduct),21 to 
exercise a power that was non-judicial in nature. This 
was despite the fact that unlike the Kable law, this law 
applied to a category of  offenders.22
In Kirby J’s view, this legislation was so extreme as to be 
reminiscent of  laws passed by the Nazi Government in 
Germany in the 1930s in which the estimated character 
of  a person was punished rather than the proven facts 
of  a crime.23
A critique of majority view
There are numerous diffi culties with the majority 
view upholding the validity of  the preventive 
detention legislation, drawing on both principle 
and practical elements.
Principle: non-application of Kable precedent
As noted above, the supposed distinctions between the 
legislation impugned in Kable and that upheld in Fardon 
are more apparent than real. It is accepted that the 
Kable law applied to one person while the Queensland 
Act considered in Fardon applied to a category, that 
the standard of  proof  in Fardon was higher than the 
standard in Kable, that the Fardon law gave the court 
… preventive detention laws allow a person to be detained 
in prison, not merely because of  something they have done 
in the past, but based on an assessment they may re-offend 
in future, if  released.
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24. The Veen case involved a convicted 
killer who was released from prison, only 
to kill further victims: Veen v The Queen 
(1979) 143 CLR 458.
25. Fardon, 55.
26. Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Review 
2002–2003’ (2003) 27 Criminal Law Journal 
325, 338; Fardon, 83; see Kevin Douglas 
and James Ogloff, ‘Multiple Facets of  Risk 
for Violence: The Impact of  Judgmental 
Specifi city on Structured Decisions About 
Violence Risk’ (2003) 2 International Journal 
of  Forensic Mental Health 19-34; James 
Ogloff  and Michael Davis, ‘Advances in 
Offender Assessment and Rehabilitation: 
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27. Kevin Douglas et al, ‘Assessing Risk for 
Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The 
HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme 
and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening 
Version’ (1999) 67 Journal of  Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology 917, 923.
28. Others believe the failure rate is much 
higher.
29. This is assuming, of  course, that he was 
in fact threatening violence. The issue of  
the accuracy of  the evidence on which an 
assessment is made about a person’s likely 
future dangerousness is another concern. It 
is possible that, for example, a prison guard 
with a grudge against an inmate may claim 
wrongly that the inmate threatened future 
violence. This evidence might be used to 
support an application for that inmate’s 
future indefi nite detention. Similarly, a 
prison guard may make this claim in order 
to secure an advantage over an inmate.
one extra option in considering the application, that 
the Kable law applied to a person whether or not they 
were incarcerated while the Fardon law only applied 
to confi ned offenders. However, in my view, this does 
not mean that the Fardon case should fall outside 
the application of  the Kable principle relating to the 
separation of  powers. The Queensland Act confers 
powers that are non-judicial in nature on a judicial 
tribunal. As in Kable, this should be seen as a breach 
of  the separation of  powers, leading members of  
the community to question the independence of  the 
judiciary from the Executive.
Asking judges to order the imprisonment of an offender 
based not (at least directly) on what that person has done 
but on what they may do surely creates (at the very least) 
uneasiness amongst members of  the community. It is 
submitted that such a power compromises the integrity 
of  the court to an unacceptable degree, as found by 
the High Court in Kable.
Practice: reliability of predictions of future behaviour
At the heart of  regimes of  this nature is the assumption 
that it is possible to predict with an acceptable degree 
of  accuracy whether a person may re-offend. We need 
to question such an assumption and test whether it is a 
plausible one.
How did the High Court majority deal with such a 
fundamental issue in Fardon? Extremely briefl y. At 
least Gleeson CJ acknowledged the problem, although 
he dismissed it very quickly with this observation: 
‘No doubt, predictions of  future danger may be 
unreliable, but as the case of  Veen24 shows, they may 
also be right’.25 With respect, does the fact that a 
prediction about the future may be right mean we 
can be confi dent that it is right? Can we be confi dent 
enough that we order the deprivation of  a person’s 
liberty on the basis of  it? How would the High Court 
respond if  the government changed the rules of  
criminal procedure so that in order to fi nd a person 
guilty of  an offence, a jury needed only to be satisfi ed 
of  the likelihood of  guilt on the balance of  probabilities? 
Would the High Court fi nd this law valid, on the basis 
that the assessment by the jury may be right? If  this is 
the criteria for assessing the validity of  criminal law, it is 
submitted to be a matter of  very grave concern for the 
liberty of  all Australians. I feel sure that citizens would 
be uneasy that their liberty could so easily be washed 
away by a determined parliament.
Justice Kirby found cross-disciplinary learning instructive 
in assessing the practicality of  this aspect of  the 
legislation, quoting Professor Kate Warner on the 
ability to predict future behaviour:
An obstacle to preventive detention is the diffi culty 
of  prediction. Psychiatrists notoriously over-predict. 
Predictions of  dangerousness have been shown to have 
only a one third to 50% success rate. While actuarial 
predictions have been shown to be better than clinical 
predictions — an interesting point as psychiatric or clinical 
predictions are central to continuing detention orders 
— neither are accurate.26
While there is no doubt that the psychiatric models 
being used to predict future dangerousness and 
violent behaviour have improved over the years, 
one paper advocating the reliability of  such a model 
itself  claims the success rate is only 70-80%.27 Are we 
comfortable removing an individual’s freedom on the 
basis of  prediction models that even their developers 
acknowledge have a 20-30% failure rate?28 This level 
is likely to meet the ‘high degree of  probability’ test 
required by the Fardon law. The result is likely to be 
that some of  those who would have committed no 
further crimes if  released are nevertheless detained in 
prison for a further indefi nite period.
Other options: rehabilitation and original sentence
It is beyond the scope of  this article to focus on why 
this kind of  law is seen by some as desirable but some 
brief  observations are necessary.
First, accepting that it is not possible to rehabilitate 
every offender and the diffi culties with and reasons for 
criminal behaviour, have the appropriate authorities 
considered why Fardon was threatening violence if  
released? This is assuming, of  course, that he was in 
fact threatening violence. The issue of  the accuracy of  
the evidence on which an assessment is made about 
a person’s likely future dangerousness is another 
concern. It is possible, for example, that a prison guard 
with a grudge against an inmate may claim wrongly that 
the inmate threatened future violence. This evidence 
might be used to support an application for that 
inmate’s future indefi nite detention. Similarly, a prison 
guard may threaten to make this claim in order to 
secure an advantage over the inmate.29 Aged 44 at the 
time of  the application made in relation to him, Fardon 
had been incarcerated for about 28 years of  his life. If  
it was true he would have re-offended if  released, this 
does not refl ect well on our rehabilitation system in 
corrective services, at least as applied to this offender 
and to any others about whom an application is made.
 AltLJ Vol 30:2 April 2005 — 79 
ARTICLES
Rather than apply a band-aid solution by making 
applications to keep some prisoners in jail, the relevant 
authorities should be working on the bigger picture 
and trying to prevent the problem rather than dealing 
with it in an eleventh-hour, last-ditch fashion that 
offends the fundamental civil liberties we all cherish. 
I would have hoped the courts would have rallied 
against such an unprincipled step by the legislature. 
Many people look to judges to uphold fundamental 
civil liberties against periodic attack by the legislature 
and/or the Executive. There is often no other means 
of  protection. It is disappointing that the court in this 
instance acquiesced in the intrusion, and it creates 
concern as to what message the decision gives to 
parliaments around Australia.
It is hoped the legislature is reviewing whether existing 
penalties for sexual offenders are adequate, particularly 
where sexual offenders have not been rehabilitated 
at the time their sentences run out. No-one wants a 
prisoner to be released, only to commit further crimes. 
This problem may provide evidence that terms of  
imprisonment for sexual offenders must be reviewed.
To order the original detention of  an offender the court 
must be satisfi ed of  the person’s guilt at a very high 
standard of  proof, that of  beyond reasonable doubt. 
To deprive a person of  their right to freedom is a grave 
matter which should not occur lightly. This legislation 
has created the anomalous situation where the 
standard of  proof  required to continue the detention 
of  an offender is less than the standard of  proof  
required to commence the detention of  an offender. 
I argue the standard of  proof  for both original and 
continued incarceration should be the same. The court 
should have to be satisfi ed beyond reasonable doubt 
that the prisoner is likely to re-offend in order to 
continue imprisonment.
The counter argument to this might be that the 
detention is civil in nature rather than criminal. 
Counters could well be made to this assertion, 
but taking it at face value the consequence should then 
be that prisoners detained pursuant to the legislation 
be treated as civil detainees rather than part of  the 
broader prison population (as they currently are). 
One might expect that civil detainees be separated 
from the broader prison population and given 
appropriate training and care specifi c to their needs 
to facilitate their eventual re-integration into society. 
However, these requirements are missing from the 
Queensland Act.
Conclusion
This kind of  law is concerned, fundamentally so, with 
civil liberties. This legislation attacks a fundamental 
civil liberty, which although objectionable, does 
not of  itself  make it unconstitutional. However, 
the involvement of  the judiciary in this crystal ball 
gazing process is unconstitutional. Such a power is 
repugnant to the judicial process in a fundamental 
way. Thinking members of  the community would 
rightly be concerned about the independence and 
integrity of  a court system in which judges are asked 
to order a person’s detention based on an educated 
guess of  what an offender may do if  released. Of  
course, no-one approves of  or condones what these 
offenders may have done in the past. However, they 
have served their full allotted term of  imprisonment 
and surely have a legitimate expectation of  release 
back into the community at that time. There are surely 
more palatable ways of  dealing with the problem of  
recidivism amongst offenders than the draconian means 
recently approved by the High Court.
At the very least, I suggest that preventive detention 
laws should only apply where the criminal standard 
of  proof  has been met in terms of  the likelihood of  
recidivism. In these unusual cases, the government 
should be required to segregate these detainees from 
the criminal prison population and to provide tailored 
programs to facilitate their needs and eventual release 
from prison. 
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Erratum
In the December 2004 edition of  the Alternative Law 
Journal in the article ‘Beneath the Sea’ by Natalie 
Bugalski, in the second paragraph under ‘Background’ 
(p 289) the sentence:
‘When in 1975 Indonesia invaded East Timor and when 
in 1976 it claimed sovereignty over half  the island …’
should read 
‘When in 1975 Indonesia invaded East Timor and when 
in 1976 it claimed sovereignty over the half  island …’
We apologise to Natalie Bugalski for this error.
One imperative for the Queensland Act was that prisoner 
Robert Fardon, who had served several terms of  imprisonment 
for a string of  violent offences, was due for release from 
a Queensland jail on 29 June 2003.
